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ABANDONING RECESS APPOINTMENTS?: A
COMMENT ON HARTNETT (AND OTHERS)
Michael Herz∗
INTRODUCTION
The Recess Appointments Clause occupies an interesting niche in
constitutional law. In terms of importance and vagueness—the two
essential ingredients of controversy and scholarly attention—it falls far
shy of, for example, the Due Process Clause. On the other hand, it does
not suffer from the irrelevance or the precision that have doomed the
title of nobility prohibitions or the requirement that the president be
thirty-five years old to the Siberia of constitutional discourse. There are
stakes, but they are not too high; there is substantial text to work with,
but no shortage of interpretive issues. In considering the scope of the
clause, moreover, one is perforce behind a sort of Rawlsian veil of
ignorance. A given interpretation may be good for your team at one
point in history and bad at another. Therefore, ideology and the appeal
of desired outcomes in the short-term can more easily be set aside here
than when considering many substantive constitutional issues.
For all these reasons, it may be especially useful to consider
questions of interpretive methodology in this setting. Such is the
purpose of this brief comment. In particular, I will discuss the role of
arguments based on purpose in interpreting the Recess Appointments
Clause. I will focus on two important recent articles: that by Edward
Hartnett in the current volume,1 and Michael Rappaport’s recent article
on the original meaning of the clause.2

∗
1

Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.
Edward Hartnett, Recess Appointments of Article III Judge: Three Constitutional
Questions, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 377 (2004).
2 Michael B. Rappaport, The Original Meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, 52
UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 2005), available at http://www.papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=601563. Professor Rappaport presented a version of this paper at the
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law’s Jurocracy and Distrust symposium, March 2004, where I
commented on Professors Hartnett and Rappaport’s presentations.
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I. READING THE RECESS APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE IN LIGHT OF ITS
PURPOSE
The explanation for the Recess Appointments Clause is not
complex. The clause represents a minor and pragmatic adjustment to
the basic appointments procedure, added to account for a particular set
of circumstances. The Constitution requires Senate confirmation for
certain appointments, but the Senate is not always available to perform
that function. If the Senate is not around, the Recess Appointments
Clause authorizes the president to make temporary appointments
without Senate approval. Allowing the president to proceed without the
Senate ensures the continued smooth functioning of the federal
government; making the appointment temporary ensures that the Senate
maintains its position within the constitutional scheme.3 As Alexander
Hamilton wrote in The Federalist:
The relation in which [the recess appointments] clause stands to the
[previous clause], which declares the general mode of appointing
officers of the United States, denotes it to be nothing more than a
supplement to the other for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary
method of appointment, in cases to which the general method was
inadequate. The ordinary power of appointment is confided to the
President and Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised
during the session of the Senate; but as it would have been improper
to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment
of officers, and as vacancies might happen in their recess, which it
might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the
succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorize the President,
singly, to make temporary appointments “during the recess of the
Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire at the end of
their next session.”4

This understanding of the clause’s purpose seems self-evident and
has never really been questioned.5 The many Attorney General
3 See, e.g., Henry B. Hogue, The Law: Recess Appointments to Article III Courts, 34
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 656, 657 (2004) (“[T]he clause was meant to allow the president to
maintain the continuity of administrative government through the temporary filling of offices
during periods when the Senate was not in session, at which time his nominees could not be
considered or confirmed.”).
4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 409-10 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961).
This excerpt is part of a discussion in which Hamilton rebuts the (far-fetched) claim that the
clause gave the president power to fill empty seats in the United States Senate. But for the need
for this rebuttal, apparently The Federalist would never have mentioned the Recess Appointments
Clause. In such silence it would have joined the delegates at Philadelphia; they engaged in no
recorded discussion of the clause.
5 See, e.g., 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1551 (1833) (noting
that the Recess Appointments Clause serves “convenience, promptitude of action, and general
security” and avoids the burden of having the Senate “perpetually in session” so as to act on the
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opinions concerning the clause operate from the premise that its purpose
is to prevent disruptive delays in filling vacancies.6 Since the clause
concerns the allocation of constitutional authority, and since its purpose
is sensible, straightforward, and unquestioned, this is an ideal setting for
what Charles Black termed “arguments from structure and
relationship.”7 Interestingly, such arguments play out quite differently
with regard to the three basic and recurring issues about the scope of the
clause: when must the vacancy arise?; what counts as a recess?; and can
the president make a recess appointment of an Article III judge?
A.

When Must the Vacancy Arise?

The Recess Appointment Clause applies to “vacancies that may
happen during the recess of the Senate.”8 The usual reading, endorsed
by Professor Hartnett, is that the clause applies when a vacancy exists
during a recess, regardless of when it arose.9 After exhaustive
consideration, however, Professor Rappaport concludes that the vacancy
must actually arise or occur during the recess.10
The most natural reading of the text supports Professor Rappaport.
“Happen” and “occur” are synonyms; the term “happen” seems to refer
to an event rather than a condition or state. Yet, almost no one reads, or
has ever read, the clause this way. Indeed, the matter lacks major
controversy, and my prediction is that Professor Rappaport’s article will
fail to generate any. Why does the clause so clearly mean something it
does not say? It can only be because the “arise” interpretation does not
make sense in light of the clause’s purpose. If the president needs to
make an appointment, and the Senate is not around, when the vacancy
president’s nominees).
6 See, e.g., 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631, 632 (1823) (describing the “meaning” of the Recess
Appointments Clause as being to permit the president to fill a vacancy, “which the public interest
requires immediately to be filled” when “the advice and consent of the Senate cannot be
immediately asked, because of their recess”; “The substantial purpose of the constitution was to
keep these offices filled; and the powers adequate to this purpose were intended to be
conveyed.”).
7 See generally CHARLES BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (1969).
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
9 See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 105-131; Rappaport, supra note 2, at 14 (“While the [arise]
interpretation was employed by the first Attorney General in 1792, the [exist] interpretation was
adopted by Attorney General Wirt in 1823 and has been followed by the government ever
since.”). The en banc Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit recently agreed, though over the
dissent of one judge who took the position that the vacancy must arise during the recess. See
Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226-27 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc); id. at 1229-31 (Barkett, J.,
dissenting).
10 Rappaport, supra note 2, at 13-44.
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arose hardly matters; the point is that it must be filled now. This
represents a straightforward instance of purpose trumping, or at least
informing our reading of, the text.11
An implicit understanding of purpose comes into play in one other
way in this argument. Attorney General Henry Stanbury once argued if
“happen” meant “occurring during the recess,” then the president could
possess authority to make a recess appointment when the Senate is in
session. This would happen if a position opened during the Senate’s
recess, triggering the recess appointment authority, but was still not
filled when Senate returned; an appointment made then would still fill a
vacancy that “happen[ed] during the recess of the Senate.” Therefore,
“happen during the recess” must mean “exist” rather than “occur.”12
The force of this argument arises from the fact any interpretation that
allows the president to make a recess appointment when there is no
recess must be wrong, because it is so flatly at odds with the clause’s
purpose.
Both Hartnett and Rappaport consider Stanbury mistaken, but not
because they would accept an interpretation under which the president
could make a recess appointment while the Senate was in session. They
each accept that any such reading must be wrong.13 Rather, for different
reasons, each concludes that the text does not pose the problem
Stanbury identifies. For Hartnett, neither the exist nor the arise reading
produces this problem; for Rappaport both equally produce the problem,
which he cures by implying a term.14 Thus, Stanbury, Hartnett, and
11 Professor Rappaport makes a strong argument for why his reading of the original meaning
of the clause is supported not only by text but by considerations of structure and purpose as well.
Id. at 17-27. For my purposes, it does not matter whether he is correct. It suffices that: (1) he is
obliged to make such an argument to contradict the more common purpose-based arguments; and
(2) other interpreters have consistently relied on purpose.
12 See 12 Op. Att’y Gen. 32, 38-39 (1866).
13
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 381 n.20; Rappaport, supra note 2, at 38-39.
14 Hartnett solves the problem by relying on the phrase “during the Recess of the Senate” to
modify, awkwardly, both its immediate antecedent (“that may happen”) and the phrase before
that (“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies”). Hartnett, supra note 1, at 381 n.
20. On this reading, the actual text requires that the president act during the recess. Rappaport’s
approach is different. He concludes that under either reading, a triggering vacancy is still a
triggering vacancy even after the Senate returns; it was either a vacancy that arose during the
recess or a vacancy that existed during the recess, as the case may be. Thus, both interpretations
require something to be read in to avoid Stanbury’s absurd result. He cures the problem by
implying the phrase “during the recess” after the word “Commissions.” Rappaport, supra note 2,
at 39. For both Hartnett and Rappaport, then, the absurdity of a recess appointment made when
the Senate is not in recess must be avoided; Stanbury was just wrong in thinking that this was a
reason to choose between the “arise” interpretation and the “exist” interpretation. Notably, each
is willing to manhandle the text pretty significantly to ensure the right result, Hartnett by making
the “during the Vacancy” phrase do ungrammatical double-duty, and Rappaport by implying
terms that are not there.
Somewhat hestitantly, I would suggest that Stanbury may actually have been correct.
Under the arise interpretation, “happen” refers to a specific event. A vacancy that “happened”
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Rappaport are all driven to find a way to ensure that the text make sense
in light of its purpose. Each takes a different route to ensure this
congruence, but each is determined to do so. That determination
illustrates the importance of reading (or even supplementing) a text in
light of its purpose; the variations illustrate one of the limitations of
doing so.
In short, the interplay of text and purpose here seems to be as
follows. The text suggests one outcome, but does not necessarily
compel it. The textual uncertainty is increased by the fact that the most
natural reading seems to produce an absurd result in one particular
setting. Because of the textual uncertainty, considerations of purpose
become critical and are sufficient to trump the text.
B.

What Counts as a Recess?

The situation is somewhat different with regard to the question of
what counts as a recess, although considerations of purpose are critical
here as well. Two issues arise: first, whether an intrasession break
counts as a recess, and second, if it does, whether some intrasession
breaks are too short to qualify. The text here is again uncertain;
“recess” is not a precise term of art. The difficulty is that considerations
of purpose do not clearly resolve the interpretive questions either.
Considerations of purpose are the basis of the intuition that an
intrasession break is not a “recess.” Intrasession breaks are generally
shorter than intersession breaks, and the problems to which the Recess
Appointments Clause responds do not arise when the Senate will be
back in a minute; the appointment can wait. On the other hand, those
who argue that the clause does extend to intrasession recesses rest that
conclusion on an argument from purpose. For example, when, in 1921,
Attorney General Daugherty rejected a predecessor’s opinion15 and
concluded that the recess appointment power does extend to intrasession
appointments, his essential justification was that intrasession breaks can
be long enough to raise a genuine concern regarding keeping the
machinery of government running.16 Moreover, intrasession recesses
(i.e. arose) “during the Recess” remains such even after the Senate returns. That is Stanbury’s
point. But under the “exist” interpretation, “happen” refers to a condition, a state of affairs, and
that state of affairs no longer exists once the Senate has returned. A vacancy that existed or was
occurring “during the Recess” is over once the recess is over.
15 See 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599 (1901) (opinion of Attorney General Knox concluding that
“recess” refers only to the break between sessions of Congress); see also Brief for the United
States in Opposition, at 28, Miller v. United States, 2004 WL 2112791 (No. 04-38) (“Intersession and intra-session recesses equally implicate the concerns and purpose of the Clause.”).
16 See 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 25 (1921) (arguing that an intrasession recess can have the same
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can be longer than intersession recesses; thus there will be instances in
which allowing recess appointments during the latter and not during the
former seems flatly inconsistent with purpose.17 Finally, the universal
unwillingness to deem a break of just a few days to be a constitutional
“recess” stems from the fact that the underlying purpose of the clause is
not at all served by allowing a recess appointment in such
circumstances. Indeed, little other than considerations of purpose might
identify a line between intrasession breaks that count as recesses and
those that do not.
With regard to the first issue (when must a vacancy arise?), the text
was somewhat unclear and considerations of purpose seem to point
strongly toward a particular interpretation, thus purpose carried the day.
With regard to the second issue (what’s a recess?), neither the text nor
the purpose point indisputably to a particular outcome. That is, the
vagueness of the text compels resort to purpose, but considerations of
purpose can be plausibly invoked to support conflicting interpretations.
C.

Can the President Make a Recess Appointment of a Judge?

Consideration of underlying purpose tends to disappear in
discussions of the third issue, whether recess appointments of Article III
judges are permissible at all. To my knowledge, no one has argued that
recess appointments of judges are necessary to ensure the smooth
functioning of the federal judiciary. In this setting, the entire emphasis
is on text and past practice, which seem to sweep all before them.
The textual support for judicial recess appointments is strong
indeed. Following the Appointments Clause’s list of presidential
appointees, which includes “judges of the supreme court and all other
officers,” the Recess Appointments Clause gives the president power to
fill “all vacancies.” That is awfully clear.18 The clarity is matched by a
practical effect as an intersession recess, but that a break of five to ten days would not trigger the
clause). Attorney General Daugherty observed that the purpose of the clause was to ensure that
the President could “keep . . . offices filled” and avoid any “interval of time where there may be
an incapacity of action.” This purpose would be defeated if intrasession recess appointment were
per se impermissible. Id. at 22-23.
17 See, e.g., Brief for the United States in Opposition, at 29, Miller v. United States, 2004 WL
2112791 (No. 04-38) (“A recess-appointment power that could be freely invoked during a oneday inter-session recess, but would be categorically barred during a three-month intra-session
recess, would . . . ill serve the purpose of the Clause.”).
18 Two efforts to create some textual uncertainty can be made. First, a later overruled panel
of the Ninth Circuit wrote that the Recess Appointments Clause “does not mention the judiciary
at all,” and thus was too weak a reed to overcome the structural arguments against judicial recess
appointments. United States v. Woodley, 726 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1983), rev’d, 751 F.2d
1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). While it is true that the Recess Appointments Clause does not
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consistent practice; presidents going back to George Washington have
made over 300 recess appointments to Article III courts.19 It is hard to
find anyone—other than losing litigants or bitter senators20—who
argues that recess appointments of Article III judges are
unconstitutional per se.21
Yet, this conclusion cannot be defended on the basis of the purpose
of the Recess Appointments Clause. There is simply no need for a
recess appointment power as to judges. The federal judiciary consists
of hundreds of judges; judges from other courts frequently sit by
designation; courts take frequent recesses themselves; with the
exception of constitutional speedy trial guarantees and the occasional
statutory requirement of expedited review, federal judges do not operate
under time limits and litigation typically lasts for years. To say that a
particular court will function better with every seat filled hardly
establishes that the appointment cannot wait until the Senate returns
from its recess.
As Professor Hartnett stresses in his opening section, not all offices
are created equal. He points to the “great lengths” that the Constitution
goes to in order to ensure that the executive branch remains functioning
at all times.22 In contrast, the Framers expected the judiciary and the
legislature to operate with breaks; the expectation was, and the practice
has been, that they will come and go, meeting only for part of the year
mention the judiciary, it does not mention the executive branch either; the silence therefore does
not create any textual ambiguity.
A second textual argument looks beyond the Appointments Clause to Article III. A timelimited recess appointment is at odds with life tenure. If Article III actually said that judges have
life tenure, then there would be a real textual conflict and uncertainty. But all Article III actually
says is that judges “shall hold their offices during good behavior.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1
(emphasis added). There is no textual inconsistency in saying that a recess-appointed judge must
be allowed to hold his office, one which expires at the end of the next Senate session, as long as
he meets the standards of good behavior. Principles of judicial independence embodied in Article
III provide a strong structural argument against judicial recess appointments, as I discuss below;
but the text of Article III is not inconsistent with that of the Recess Appointments Clause.
19 Hogue, supra note 3, at 659. There have been only four such appointments, including the
appointments of Pickering and Pryor, in the last forty years. Id.
20 See Brief of Amicus Curiae Senator Edward M. Kennedy in Support of Petitioner at 14-20,
Miller v. United States (No. 03-48) (supporting the petition for a writ of certiorari) (arguing that
recess appointments of Article III judges are unconstitutional, at least if made during an
intrasession recess).
21 See generally Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (holding that
the recess appointments power extends to Article III judges); accord United States v. Woodley,
751 F.2d 1008 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc); United States v. Allocco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962);
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 151-153; Lawrence Solum, Going Nuclear: The Constitutionality Of
Recess Appointments to Article III Courts, Legal Theory Blog (April 30, 2003), at
http://lsolum.blogspot.com/2003_04_01_lsolum_archive.html. Professor Rappaport does not
address this question, but seems implicitly to accept the constitutionality of judicial recess
appointments.
22 Hartnett, supra note 1, at 102.
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in terms, or sessions. Accordingly, a little down time creates far fewer
problems for the judiciary than for the executive. Indeed, it is to be
assumed. Professor Hartnett’s discussion concerns the nature of a
congressional “session” and a congressional “recess.” But, his account
also highlights a large difference between judicial appointments and
executive appointments.
Moreover, powerful structural reasons prompt caution with regard
to recess appointments. A recess appointee serves a limited term,
lacking life tenure,23 and in most cases will be hoping for Senate
confirmation before that term ends. These circumstances put the recess
appointee in something of the same position as a law professor on a
“look-see visit”; his or her job becomes one extended interview. These
circumstances are utterly at odds with the commitment to judicial
independence reflected in Article III’s good behavior clause and salary
protections.24
In short, the question whether the Recess Appointments Clause
applies to Article III judges raises a stark conflict between, on the one
hand, structure and purpose and, on the other hand, clear text and settled
practice (which, given how longstanding that practice is, also tells us
something about the original understanding). As is generally the case in
such settings, text wins.25
II. VARYING PURPOSES, CONSTANT TEXT
The foregoing raises three additional questions of general
relevance to constitutional interpretation. The broadest concerns the
interplay of text and purpose, which falls outside the scope of this
comment. But two questions remain: first, whether considerations of
purpose may lead to different interpretations of the same text in
different settings; and, second, whether it is proper to stick to an old text
and justify the constant understanding by changing purposes.

23 Cf. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60 (1982)
(emphasizing values of an independent judiciary and the constitutional structures designed to
ensure that independence).
24 See generally United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1022-24 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)
(Norris, J., dissenting).
25 See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1245 (1987) (arguing for a hierarchy of sources of
constitutional interpretation in which text is at the top, followed, in order, by intent,
“constitutional theory” (which, in Fallon’s taxonomy, includes arguments based on purpose and
structure), precedent, and moral and policy values).

2005]

ABANDONING RECESS APPOINTMENTS?
A.

451

How Many Appointments Clauses?

The Constitution seems to contain only one Appointments Clause.
The same text, and so the same procedures, apply to the appointment of
all federal officers, including the wide range of executive branch
officials as well as federal judges. Yet, officials and judges come in all
shapes and sizes. The Appointments Clause makes only one minor
provision for this variation, allowing Congress to eliminate advice and
consent for “inferior officers.”26 Other than that, it establishes one
mechanism for a variety of different appointments.
Procedures must be tailored to the setting. The Supreme Court’s
balancing test in Mathews v. Eldridge27 articulates a general truth:
appropriate procedures are a function of what goals one seeks to
achieve. In other words, procedures will vary with circumstances. If
the offices to which appointments are made vary, then the
constitutionally established appointments process will be suboptimal in
many of its applications.
Small wonder, then, that while on paper only one Appointments
Clause exists, in practice there are at least three. Consider the
requirement of senatorial advice and consent: The Senate plays a very
different role for Supreme Court appointments than for executive
branch appointments, where it is far more deferential.28 The blocked
judicial nominees for George W. Bush’s first term would all have been
confirmed to executive branch positions, as their non-judicial
counterparts were. Miguel Estrada could have been Attorney General;
John Ashcroft could not have been a judge on the D.C. Circuit. While
the Senate occasionally disapproves an executive nominee, and, more
often, a nominee facing a bruising confirmation battle withdraws or is
abandoned by the president,29 overall, the Senate approval rate is far
higher for these nominees. When the Senate rejected the nomination of
John Tower, the first President Bush’s nominee for Secretary of
Defense, in 1989, he was the first cabinet nominee in thirty years to be
26 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (“Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.”).
27 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
28 See, e.g., ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL
REGULATION 62-64 (1983) (noting that despite the Senate’s ostensible role in confirming
nominees, “the appointment of regulatory officials in practice has clearly been an executive
branch prerogative”).
29 The names of Bernard Kerik, Launi Guanier, and Zoe Baird come to mind. See Eric Lipton
& William K. Rashbaum, Kerik Withdraws as Bush’s Nominee for Security Post, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 11, 2004, at A1; Michael Kelly, Settling In: The President’s Day; Clinton Cancels Baird
Nomination for Justice Dept., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 1993, at A1; Neil A. Lewis, Clinton Abandons
His Nominee for Rights Post Amid Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 1993, at A1.
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voted down. There has not been another since.30 Indeed, only eight
cabinet nominees have ever been rejected by the Senate.31 Moreover,
the striking difference in confirmation rates of judicial and non-judicial
nominees understates the difference in the level of deference.
Presidents nominate against the background of this general
understanding; thus, some potential judicial nominees are scratched off
the list as unconfirmable without ever being nominated, whereas the
president can be relatively bold in choosing executive branch officials.32
Not only is there a difference between judicial and executive
appointments, there exist profound differences within the former. The
Senate’s role in Supreme Court appointments, though, of course,
varying, has always been more consent than advice. With District Court
judgeships, on the other hand, it is the White House that historically has
consented, as the de facto appointment power lies with the home state
senator(s) of the president’s party.33
This variation raises the question whether the constitutional
standard varies with the office or only the practice under that standard.
The question is perhaps nonsensical, since disentangling “law” from
practice, mutual understanding, accommodation, and politics is
probably impossible here. I do not think it unreasonable, however, to
suggest that the Senate’s power does indeed vary as a matter of
constitutional law. Considerations of structure suggest both a greater
need for senatorial involvement and review with regard to judges than
executive officials and a stronger argument for presidential autonomy in
the selection of the latter than the former. Without entering into the
debate about the unitary executive, the constitutionality of independent
agencies, and the general nature of presidential authority, I would at
least say that the president possesses significant power to direct
executive officials, which he lacks with regard to judges, as well as a
legitimate need to be able to count on their loyalty and like-mindedness.
Accordingly, muscular advice and consent with regard to executive
officials would interfere with the president’s constitutional authority—
would be “unconstitutional”—when the same level of scrutiny of
judicial appointees would not.34
30 Michael J. Gerhardt, Norm Theory and the Future of the Federal Appointments Process, 50
DUKE L.J. 1687, 1690 & n.12 (2001).
31 Id.
32 See generally William G. Ross, The Senate’s Constitutional Role in Confirming Cabinet
Nominees and Other Executive Officers, 48 SYR. L. REV. 1123 (1998) (arguing for a more robust
Senate role).
33 See Donald R. Songer et al., Presidential Success Through Appointments to the United
States District Courts, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 283, 284-85 (2003).
34 The analysis is more complicated than this, for what matters is not merely the strictness of
the Senate’s review, but also the permissible grounds for rejection. Suppose we agree that it is
constitutionally legitimate for the Senate to consider (either strictly or deferentially) a judicial
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So, the upshot seems to be this: a single, vague text applies in
quite different settings. The interpretation of this text is, necessarily,
informed by considerations of structure and purpose. As a result, the
same words mean something different in the different settings.35
Suppose we take a similar approach to the answers to all three of
our basic questions: When must the vacancy arise? What is a recess?
Which offices may be filled with recess appointments? If purpose is
weighted heavily, the answers could vary according to the office in
question. Most obviously, the president would have a freer hand with
regard to recess appointments of executive branch officials than with
regard to judges, both because the need for dispatch is greater and
because the case for presidential autonomy is stronger. Hartnett
suggests some self-restraint along these lines, but he sees it as coming
from political forces and mutual understandings, not constitutional
law.36 I would put it more strongly. The Recess Appointments Clause,
as a deviation from standard procedures, should be read no more
expansively than its purpose requires. That makes it legitimate, despite
the constant text, to conclude that intrasession appointments are
permissible for executive branch appointees but not for judges, or even
that recess appointments of judges are impermissible altogether.
B.

An Aside on the Filibuster

The interplay of text and purpose with regard to recess
appointments makes the constitutional question quite different from, for
example, the question of the constitutionality of filibustering judicial
nominees. Here too the structural considerations vary with the setting.
Therefore the filibuster of a nomination does not necessarily pose the
same constitutional issues as the filibuster of proposed legislation.37 An
nominee’s integrity, competence, and ideology. (The last is of course a matter of debate, see
generally Lawrence Solum, Judicial Selection: Ideology versus Character, 26 CARDOZO L. REV.
659 (2004).) It would still be constitutionally quite dubious for the Senate to reject an executive
branch nominee because it disagreed with the nominee’s ideology. To the contrary, the general
understanding is that the president, having won the election, must be left free to choose
appointees precisely because their ideological commitments align with his, and the Senate is
obligated to accept that.
35 For an example of just this approach to understanding the Senate’s constitutional powers
and obligations under the advice-and-consent provision, see David A. Strauss & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process, 101 YALE L.J. 1491, 150102 (1992).
36 See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 162-165.
37 In their contribution to the present volume, Professors Chemerinsky and Fisk pause only
briefly before concluding that there is no distinction between filibustering judges and filibustering
other matters. See Erwin Chemerinsky & Catherine Fisk, In Defense of Filibustering Judicial
Nominations, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 331 (2004). For the reasons that follow, it seems to me the
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appointments filibuster shifts power to the Senate, or at least a part of
the Senate, taking it away from the president. Simply put, it makes it
harder for the president to get his nominees approved. A legislative
filibuster, however, makes it harder for the proponents of legislation
(which may include the president but necessarily and essentially
includes other members of Congress) to get their bills enacted. It does
not raise the same issues of the dilution of presidential authority. Even
where the president is the proponent of legislation, there is less reason
to be concerned about creating barriers to his legislative agenda than
there is to be concerned about creating barriers to his appointments,
since in the one setting his role is secondary and in the other it is
primary.
The reason there is clearly room for such considerations is that
the Constitution does not include a “Filibuster Clause,” defining the
scope of the “filibuster power” and, depending on its terms, perhaps
precluding the possibility that the constitutionality of filibusters
would vary with the circumstances. Absent a directly applicable
text, arguments of purpose and structure mark the beginning and end
of the inquiry.

C.

Changing Purposes

Modern transportation and the change in the frequency with which
the Senate meets render the Recess Appointments Clause an
anachronism. As with the requirement that no congressional district
have fewer than 30,000 people,38 changed circumstances make it
obsolete. The Senate is simply never out of session long enough for a
vacancy, in particular a judicial vacancy, truly to need filling before its
return. Certainly, no one could suggest with a straight face that the
recent recess appointments of judges were in any way related to the
clause’s underlying purposes. In each case, the Senate returned within a
week or less, and the nominations had been stalled for months.39 If any
possibility of such a distinction is more serious than they perceive it to be, although they may be
right that the distinction cannot ultimately be made, or enforced.
38 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
39 Judge Pryor was appointed on Friday, February 20, 2004, during a ten-day, intrasession
recess. The Senate was returning the following Tuesday. Hogue, supra note 3, at 656. The
vacancy had arisen in December 2000; Pryor was nominated for a permanent position in April
2003. Rappaport, supra note 2, at 4 n.9.
Judge Pickering was appointed on Friday, January 16, 2004, during the intersession recess.
See Neil A. Lewis, Bush Seats Judge After Long Fight, Bypassing Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2004, at A1. The Senate went into session the following Tuesday, January 20. Pickering had
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urgency existed, it was created not by the Senate’s absence but by its
imminent return; a physical inability to act on the nominations was
hardly the problem.
I am told that Sigmund Freud advised his patients never to get
married while they were in analysis. The decision was sufficiently
momentous, and the analysand’s state of mind in sufficient upheaval,
that it made sense to wait. Such a prohibition looks like a pretty
significant restraint, since psychoanalysis can go on just about forever.
Apparently modern analysts have backed away from Freud’s rule. The
standard explanation for this deviation is that when Freud was
practicing “analyses were short, and marriages were long.” Similarly,
in the context of recess appointments, in the early days of the Republic
vacancies were short, and recesses were long. But now we have a more
or less permanent Congress while the process of filling judicial
vacancies takes months or years. During the first two years of the
Carter administration, judicial vacancies remained open for an average
of thirty-eight days; during the last two Clinton years, that number was
226 days.40 It is simply impossible to justify modern uses of the Recess
Appointments Clause in terms of its original purpose.
That does not mean, however, that recess appointments lack an
important function. For example, the recess appointment power has
been critical to the appointment of minorities to the bench.41 When the
politics are right, a recess appointment may help the ultimate
confirmation of a controversial nominee. Recently, President Bush has
found it a tool for circumventing and/or publicizing what he deems the
uncooperativeness, if not the unconstitutional obstructionism, of Senate
Democrats. It has also been suggested that recess appointments can

first been nominated on May 5, 2001, more than two and a half years before his recess
appointment. Judiciary Committee Report on Nominees, 108th Congress, Dec. 10, 2004, at 17,
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/noms/108/committee_report.pdf.
Judge Gregory was appointed on December 27, 2000, after the 106th Congress adjourned
sine die; the new Senate began its session on January 3, 2001. Gregory had been nominated on
June 30, 2000. Louis Fisher, Recess Appointments of Federal Judges, CRS Report RL31112
(Sept. 5, 2001), at 22, available at http://www.senate.gov/reference/resources/pdf/RL31112.pdf.
40 Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 679 (2003).
41 The most famous instance is President Kennedy’s recess appointment of Thurgood
Marshall to the Second Circuit. See generally Richard L. Revesz, Thurgood Marshall’s Struggle,
68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 237 (1993) (describing the tortured course of Marshall’s nomination and
recess appointment and the subsequent delay, repeated hearings, threatened filibuster, and
eventual, 11th-hour confirmation by the Senate). But it is also not a coincidence that Roger
Gregory, the first African-American appointee to the Fourth Circuit, was a recess appointment, as
were four of the first five African-American appointees to the Federal Courts of Appeals—in
addition to Marshall, they were William Hastie, A. Leon Higginbotham, and Spottswood
Robinson. See President Clinton Appoints Roger Gregory to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit (White House Press Briefing, Dec. 27, 2000), available at
http://clinton4.nara.gov/WH/new/html/Fri_Dec_29_135529_2000.html.

456

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:2

lead to a healthy national dialogue about appointments criteria.42
These justifications are all what in administrative law are
dismissed as “ex post rationalizations,” which by their very ex post-ness
are insufficient bases for upholding agency action.43 Should such
justifications inform the understanding of the scope of the recess
appointments power? Put differently, can or do we have a dead
Constitution with living purposes?44
I want to distinguish three different sorts of arguments from
purpose and structure. Two are utterly familiar. First, one might argue
that because of changing circumstances, the reading of the Constitution
must change so that it can continue to fulfill its original purposes. So,
for example, David Strauss and Cass Sunstein argue that the Senate’s
advice and consent authority should be read as more robust at present
than in the past, because a variety of circumstances have shifted
excessive authority from Congress to the president.45 In order for the
overall system to function as intended, the Senate must go beyond its
traditional (at least traditional for the last century or so) relatively
restrained role. This is a standard “living Constitution” sort of
argument. Applied to the recess appointments power, this approach
argues for “interpreting” the recess appointment power narrowly, since
it is wholly unjustifiable by its original purposes.46
42 See Randolph J. May, Checkmate in the Judges Game? For Democracy’s Sake, President
Bush Should Threaten a Recess Appointment, or Two, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 8, 2003, at 58
(recommending the use of recess appointments and suggesting that “the heat generated by recess
appointments would create the opportunity—indeed, necessity—for the president to lead an
edifying dialogue”).
43 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 49-50
(1983).
44 The goal of a “dead Constitution” is a familiar trope of Justice Scalia’s. See, e.g., Sally K.
Hilander, Justice Scalia Debunks the “Living Constitution” Theory, 24 MONT. LAWYER 1, 33
(1998) (quoting Scalia as saying in a speech that while “[m]ost Americans now believe the
Constitution is a living document,” he was “here to try to sell you the dead Constitution”). For a
standard statement of his rejection of the “living Constitution” approach, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 41-47 (1997).
45 See Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 35. The nature of their argument is illustrated by the
following passage:
[S]ince 1969, circumstances have changed. Current conditions—conditions that are
unique in our history—justify a more active role for the Senate. These circumstances
include a large number of consecutive appointments by Presidents of one party during
a period of divided government; the danger of intellectual homogeneity on the current
Court; overt ideological attacks by the President on the Court and the self-conscious
screening of nominees to the Court by the executive branch; the effective exclusion of
the Senate from the selection of lower federal court judges; and the increased
importance of separation of powers questions. Under these conditions, deference by the
Senate is likely to produce neither a Court of high quality nor a Court with the
appropriate range of views.
Id. at 1502-03 (footnote omitted).
46 Professor Hartnett convincingly shows that recess appointments of judges were necessary
to ensure the smooth functioning of the judiciary at the time of the founding. See Hartnett, supra
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Alternatively, one could focus on circumstances at the framing in
trying to read the text in light of its contemporary purpose, the sort of
archeological inquiry that Professor Rappaport conducts. He takes
questions of purpose and structure very seriously, not because they will
produce a sound construction of the Constitution for the present day, but
because they help reveal the original understanding. Under this
approach, the fact that the Recess Appointments Clause is no longer
justifiable for the original reasons is neither here nor there. Those
reasons were coherent at the time, and the resulting provision stands
unless and until the Constitution is amended.
A third way argument from purpose would be to invoke new
purposes—values the clause now serves that were inapplicable two
centuries ago. Suppose we conclude that the original justifications once
supported extending the recess appointment power to judges and to
intrasession appointments. They no longer do. But we have new
reasons for giving the president such authority. Do they count?
Such purposes undeniably do count with regard to the continued
existence of an ancient provision. Legislatures keep in place old laws
that have long outlived their original justifications but serve new and
different purposes. We do the same with regard to the Constitution.
The Electoral College is an example. The framers’ goals (for example,
preventing a popular vote47 and ensuring the dominance of slave
states48) no longer justify this mechanism for presidential selection. To
the extent the Electoral College survives for reasons other than inertia,
however, it is because its current supporters articulate other
justifications.49
My inquiry is slightly different, however. It is whether newly
discovered purposes should not only justify the continued existence of
the Electoral College, or the Recess Appointments Clause, but whether
they should inform interpretation of the relevant constitutional
provisions. The answer must be yes, but with reduced weight. The
inquiry changes from one about “purpose” to one about “policy.” If
purposive interpretation differs from mere consideration of policy,50 it is
because of the lawmaking authority of the original enactors. Once we
note 1, at 154. My point is only that circumstances have utterly changed since, which is why the
argument here is in its nature identical to that made by Strauss and Sunstein.
47 See, e.g., Thomas E. Cronin, Foreword, in JUDITH A. BEST, THE CHOICE OF THE PEOPLE?:
DEBATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE ix (1996) (noting the delegates’ particular opposition “to
direct election by the people because many delegates thought it unlikely or impractical for the
average citizen to know enough about candidates from other states, and doubtless, too, most
delegates questioned the ability of the people to case responsible votes”).
48
See id. at ix-x; Paul Finkelman, The Proslavery Origins of the Electoral College, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1145, 1154-56 (2002).
49 See generally BEST, supra note 47.
50 See Fallon, supra note 25.
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exchange their purposes for ours, we are invoking policy alone.
The Recess Appointments Clause thus lands us in a peculiar
position. Inquiries into purpose are a standard and important tool in
interpreting the clause. Yet the sort of argument Strauss and Sunstein
make—that a particular interpretation will further the framers’
purposes—is unavailable. The clause has become irrelevant to the
framers’ purposes. One can take the milder position that a certain
interpretation reflects sound policy. And one can argue, as both
Hartnett and Rappaport do, that a particular reading would have served
the framers’ purposes a century or two ago. But the only reading that is
now consistent with the framers’ purposes, at least with regard to judges
and arguably with regard to all appointees, is to read the clause out of
the Constitution. That option seems foreclosed by the text.
III. FORMALISM AND FUNCTIONALISM IN SEPARATION OF POWERS
For two decades, the methodological debate in matters of
separation of powers such as this has been between formalists and
functionalists.51 That distinction usually arises when evaluating the
constitutionality of an innovation—the legislative veto,52 the
independent counsel,53 the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act.54
The
question is whether changed circumstances justify some deviation from
the Constitution’s formal and literal requirements. Functionalists
endorse flexibility, often on the ground that modified governmental
structures serve underlying constitutional goals as well as, if not better
than, strict adherence to literal constitutional prescriptions.55
The question I have raised here is different. It is not about the
constitutional legitimacy of an innovation; rather it concerns whether
the old ways of doing things can still be justified given changed

51 See Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1530 (1991) (describing “the scholarly debate about separated powers” as “polarized, for the most
part, between the formalists and the functionalists—a battle between those who would pay the
price of rigidity in order to achieve an elusive determinacy on the one hand, and those who would
pay the price of indeterminacy in order to achieve unguided flexibility on the other”); Peter L.
Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish
Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488 (1987) (first using the terms “formalism” and
“functionalism” in this context).
52 See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down one-house legislative veto
provision).
53 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (upholding independent counsel law).
54 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986) (setting aside balanced budget law).
55
See, e.g., Chadha, 462 U.S. at 974 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that changed
circumstances had rendered the legislative veto “necessary if Congress is to fulfill its designated
role under Art. I as the Nation’s lawmaker”).
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circumstances. Bill Eskridge has observed that “[f]ormalist reasoning
promises stability and continuity of analysis over time; functionalist
reasoning promises adaptability and evolution.”56 Might the
functionalist commitment to adaptability and evolution result in the
elimination of the recess appointment power given its obsolescence?
The answer is clearly no. That time has kicked the foundations out
from under a power-granting provision so that it no longer serves its
original functions may permit a narrowing construction. It does not
allow a court to announce the provision ineffective or void.57 In this
setting, everyone is a formalist.
And yet no one is. It is a familiar point that a formalist objection
to particular governmental arrangements or assertions of authority
invites a formalist response. For example, after the Supreme Court
struck down the legislative veto, in INS v. Chadha,58 because the i’s and
t’s of Article I, § 7 had not been dotted and crossed, then-Judge Breyer
wrote an article explaining how Congress could set up an arrangement
that was in every practical respect identical to the legislative veto but
satisfied the Court’s formalist objections.59
Similarly, one could imagine lawyerly and formalist initiatives
with regard to recess appointments. Suppose Professor Rappaport is
correct, and for purposes of the clause a “recess” is the period between
sessions of Congress. The Constitution does not require that each
Congress hold two and only two “sessions.” I would think that pursuant
to the authority of each House to make rules for its own proceedings60
Congress could decide to hold twelve “sessions” each calendar year,
with a few days off—perhaps just a weekend—between them.61 Under
this setup, all recesses would be “intersession” recesses, and
appointments such as Judge Pryor’s would be permissible even under
56 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Case, 22 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21 (1998).
57 The consensus on this point is seen, for example, in the almost uniformly negative reaction
to Judge Calabresi’s analogous argument that judges should assert the authority to invalidate
obsolescent statutes. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982).
58 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
59 Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha, 72 GEO. L.J. 785, 793-95 (1984).
Breyer’s proposal, which, in his words, “is not a precise functional replica of the veto, but it
comes close,” id. at 795, was for a fast track mechanism for automatic congressional confirmation
of agency regulations through “legislation,” which would require action, akin to the veto, to derail
this process of default approval.
A similar proposal surfaced with regard to the line item veto. If Congress maintained its
existing procedures, but then had an employee disaggregate its spending bills so that each section
had its own bill number, the president would have what is functionally the line item veto, because
each line item would be a separate “bill,” that he could sign or veto.
60 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings . . . .”).
61 Professor Hartnett concludes that Congress would have to make such a change “by law,”
meaning the President would have to agree. See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 146-147.
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Professor Rappaport’s view. While such a change increases the
opportunities for recess appointments, it would in fact decrease rather
than enhance presidential authority. The appointee’s commission must
“expire at the End of their next Session,” which would be, by definition,
the following month. This device would in effect eliminate the recess
appointment power.
Why then does Congress not take such action? In principle,
Congress should be wary about recess appointments, which by their
nature reduce the Senate’s power and increase the president’s. One
would think that it would take what measures it could to undercut the
president’s power here and so increase its own. Several answers
suggest themselves. First, such a change might require the president’s
signature,62 which would be unlikely. Second, as of this writing,
“Congress”—defined as a majority of senators—does not want to
reduce the president’s recess appointment power. They want to see
more nominations go ahead and, like President Bush, view recess
appointments as one response to the frustrations of Democratic
filibusters.
But the third, and I think most important, reason is that these things
never happen. In contrast to the innovative mechanisms that, say, tax
lawyers create in order to adhere to the limitations of form while
evading a rule’s underlying functional justifications, Congress does not
try to legislate its way around formal limitations. Thus, proposals for a
fast-track confirmatory procedure, or for disaggregating spending
measures into hundreds of separate “bills,” never went anywhere.
Neither would the twelve-sessions-a-year idea. There are surely many
reasons why they do not. But the beginning of an answer would seem
to lie in the facts that: (1) Congress and the president both realize that
two can play this game; (2) political will always matters as much as
legal authority; and (3) the participants are all repeat players, who do
not know whether their side is going to control the White House,
Congress, both, or neither at any given point and so cannot risk shifting
too much authority to any particular locus.
CONCLUSION
The Recess Appointments Clause should be read in light of its
purpose. Both Professor Hartnett and Professor Rappaport do so,
though the first relies on purpose to understand the clause’s modern
meaning and the second to understand its original meaning. Because
62

See supra note 61.
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recess appointments, or at least recess appointments of judges, simply
do not serve the original purposes underlying the clause, the task of
purposive interpretation is more complex than it first seems. I have
tried to unpack some of the opportunities and limitations of arguments
from purpose and structure in this setting.

